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The recent article (Turalska et al., 2012) discusses the emergence of intelligence via
criticality as a consequence of locality breakdown. Herein, we use criticality for the
foundation of a novel generation of game theory making the local interaction between
players yield long-range effects. We first establish that criticality is not confined to the
Ising-like structure of the sociological model of (Turalska et al., 2012), called the decision
making model (DMM), through the study of the emergence of altruism using the altruism-
selfishness model (ASM). Both models generate criticality, one by imitation of opinion
(DMM) and the other by imitation of behavior (ASM). The dynamics of a sociological
network S influences the behavioral network F through two game theoretic paradigms:
(i) the value of altruism; (ii) the benefit of rapid consensus. In (i), the network S debates the
moral issue of altruism by means of the DMM, while at the level F the individuals operate
according to the ASM. The individuals of the level S, through a weak influence on the
individuals of the level F , exert a societal control on F , fitting the principle of complexity
management and complexity matching. In (ii), the benefit to society is the rapid attainment
of consensus in the S level. The agents of the level F operate according to the prisoner’s
dilemma prescription, with the defectors acting as DMM contrarians at the level S. The
contrarians, acting as the inhibitory links of neural networks, exert on society the same
beneficial effect of maintaining the criticality-induced resilience that they generate in neural
networks. The conflict between personal and social benefit makes the networks evolve
toward criticality. Finally, we show that the theory of this article is compatible with recent
discoveries in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience.
Keywords: temporal complexity, phase transition, criticality-induced synchronization, game theory, behavioral
psychology, neural and social criticality
1. Introduction
The recent article (Turalska et al., 2012) offers a new theoretical perspective on the network science
of learning that we adopt herein to explain the emergence of altruism and cognition in complex
networks. The emergence of altruism seems to conflict with the widely accepted idea that the action
of the individual is mainly dictated by the goal of maximizing personal profit. One purpose of game
theory is to determine the truth of this conviction. This too is the main goal of the new forms
of game theory that we propose herein. The novelty of the present approach is the adoption of
concepts developed in the field of complex networks and especially those from the last frontier
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of complexity (D’Agostino and Scala, 2014), namely, from the
subject of multilayer networks. To explain the significance of
the proposed approach, it is necessary to compare it with the
dominant views from the field of complex networks.
The theory of complex networks has been shaped, in part, by
the pioneering work of Albert and Barabási (2002) who popu-
larized the class of complex networks whose probability density
function (PDF) P(k) of links has an inverse power-law structure
P (k)  1k : (1)
Due to the fact that this PDF describes a network having multiple
scales, with no one scale dominating, it is referred to as a scale-free
distribution of links and the network is called scale-free. This is the
origin of the popularity of complex networks, interpreted as being
characterized by a scale-free distribution of links. This success led
many researchers to study dynamical processes occurring in such
scale-free networks within multiple disciplines. In the original
model of Albert and Barabási, a scale-free network is generated
by a dynamical process in which new nodes are attracted by
previously existing nodes in proportion to the number of links to
those nodes. We are convinced that what has been learned from
the study of dynamical processes on scale-free networks has been
based on the implicit assumption that the process responsible for
the emergence of a scale-free PDF of links has been exhausted.
Thus, those studies have been limited to the benefits emerging
from the adoption of a scale-free topology, with little or no discus-
sion of the open problem of what sort of dynamics occurs while
the scale-free distribution of links is taking shape.
Turalska et al. (2012) show that a scale-free topology can
emerge from an ordinary regular lattice, where, in accordance
with the principle that all men are created equal, each of the
individuals in the network have the same number of links. Every
organized “society,” ranging from human (Turalska et al., 2013) to
neural (Fraiman et al., 2009), is assumed to be at criticality. The
dynamics of criticality generate time-dependent links with scale-
free PDFs (Fraiman et al., 2009; Turalska et al., 2012). Thus, we
have a few individuals with a large number of links and many
more individuals with only a few links, a condition that is dynamic
rather than static. It has been determined that leadership in such
networks changes from one individual to another and that in the
long-time dynamics the leadership role is uniformly shared by all
individuals within the network.
The adoption of a static scale-free topology prevents one from
discovering another important property emerging from Tural-
ska et al. (2012): criticality-induced long-range correlation. This
emergent correlation makes it possible to go beyond the local
nature of the current forms of game theory (Nowak and May,
1992, 1993; Eshel et al., 1998). Embedding a scale-free network
into a two-dimensional lattice has the effect of generating large-
scale perception (Hollingshad et al., 2012), thereby reiterating the
importance of criticality-induced long-range correlation. Herein,
we use the dynamic properties of complex networks (Turalska
et al., 2012) to develop new forms of game theory and a new
interpretation of cognition as well. We interpret the emergence of
cognition as an effect produced by the transmission of informa-
tion from one complex network at criticality to another complex
network at criticality (Vanni et al., 2011; Luković et al., 2014).
In Section 2, we discuss a model for the imitation-induced
emergence of altruism. We show that this altruism model shares
with the cooperative models of earlier work (Vanni et al., 2011),
the property of generating long-range correlation between distant
elements, an important property that we plan to emphasize in the
new forms of game theory. Section 3 explains that the two forms of
game theory we propose in this article are based on the interaction
between the sociological networkS and the behavioral networkF .
Section 4 illustrates the value of altruism game theory. Section 5
illustrates the benefit of rapid consensus game theory. In Section 6,
we argue that our approach to game theory may shed light on the
emergence of cognition and facilitate progress toward a behavioral
approach to economics.
2. Dynamics of Altruism and Selfishness
The model we study in this section is based on two states: A
denoting altruism and S selfishness. The main purpose of this
section is to establish that, due to imitation-induced criticality,
an action exerted on a small group of individuals localized on a
two-dimensional regular network, is transmitted to long distances
from this small group. This transmission of information supports
our claim that the behavior of rewarding fairness or punishing
selfishness even if applied locally to a specific set of individuals
may have long-range effects. This would be assured if the game
theory is designed in such a way as to include criticality and
temporal complexity (Turalska et al., 2011).
FollowingTuralska et al. (2012), we assumed a two-dimensional
lattice, and assign to each individual located on a node either the
state A or the state S, with random initial prescription. At each
time step, the elements can either change state or remain in the
same state, according to the following procedure. If the element is
in the state A, it can jump to the state S with an exponential PDF
at the rate
 = 0   MAM ; (2)
where M is the number of nearest neighbors of the element and
MA the number of nearest neighbors in the state A. We use a
two-dimensional lattice withM= 4. This prescription implies that
if the individual is surrounded by only selfish people s/he has a
tendency to move to the selfish state as a consequence of human
nature. Here, human nature is assumed to be non-altruistic. How-
ever, if some of the neighbors are altruistic, the transition rate
decreases. If the individual is in the state S, the transition rate is
given by
! = KMAM : (3)
In this case, no transition occurs if all the neighbors are selfish. The
algorithm generating the choice of either selfishness or altruism is
illustrated in Figure 1. The network is expected to reach criticality,
namely achieve a condition where altruism does not become
extinct, by either increasing  or increasing K.
Here, we keep K fixed and generate criticality by changing .
After randomly distributing the individuals on the network, half
in each state, the model is run for a total time Ttotal= 1.01 108.
We externally force a small cluster, 1% of the total number of
individuals, to adopt the altruist state for a timeT= 2 105. Then,
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the algorithm used to update the state in the altruism-selfishness model.
we externally force this same cluster into the selfishness state
for a time interval of equal length. The time evolution of all the
elements at distance d from those transmitting the dichotomous
signal is monitored. We divide the interval T into smaller time
intervals of equal size 2 104. In each of these smaller intervals,
the single elements have fluctuations that are averaged over so
that each subinterval is assigned a value equal to the time average.
Subsequently, the average is taken over the elements at the same
distance d from the driving group. The algorithm used to force the
whole system to adopt either altruismor selfishness, via criticality-
induced long-range correlation, is illustrated in Figure 2.
The result of this numerical procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.
The dichotomous black line is the signal that the small cluster
of 1% of the total number of units transmits to all the other
units of the same network. Figure 3 shows that the information
of the transmitted signal becomes less and less accurate as the
distance between the transmitters and the receivers increases. In
other words, this is the same as the numerical experiments done
previously (Vanni et al., 2011; Luković et al., 2014), with the
added benefit of a more quantitative analysis of the criticality-
induced enhancement of information transmission. In Figure 3,
we see that the intensity of the signal diminishes as the distance
between the driven elements and those responding via the net-
work’s dynamics increases. Note that below and above critical-
ity, the signal decay is exponential, while at criticality, it is an
inverse power-law. Figure 4 shows this important property in
detail.Moving the altruismparameter from= 0 to= 0.033, the
information decay is exponential with a decreasing rate. For values
of , increasingly departing from criticality, the information decay
becomes faster and faster. At criticality, = c= 0.033, we fit the
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the algorithm used to generate Figure 3.
information decay with an inverse power-law with power index
 = 1.28.
In Section 4, we discuss how to use this imitation approach
to altruism for the first form of game theory proposed herein.
The results of this section, in accordance with the views of West
et al. (2014), confirm the sociological importance of imitation and
afford support to the goal of this article: establishing a new form
of game theory taking imitation into account.
3. Toward a New Game Theory
The prisoner’s dilemma was invented to codify and investigate
the conflict between cooperation and personal benefit in human
decision making. In their game theory, Nowak and May (1992)
adopted the prisoner’s dilemma to address the challenging issue of
explaining how cooperation may emerge from the social interac-
tion of individuals who are assumed tomake decisions on the basis
of maximizing personal profit. Another version of game theory
includes the concept of cooperation cost, introduced to explain
why cooperation may enhance the overall payoff without elimi-
nating the incentive to defect (Szabó and Fáth, 2007). According
to social psychology, the decision-making process of individuals
is not only determined by the criterion of maximal financial
FIGURE 3 | A small cluster (1% of the total number of units) is forced
to stay in the altruism state for a time T, then to move to the
selfishness state for the same time T, and so on in this manner.
FIGURE 4 | Decay of the information with the distance, obtained by
recording the top envelope. The gray straight line, with power-law index
1.28, fits the thick black line, corresponding to the critical value =0.033.
The red curves correspond to the  values (approaching criticality) 0.0, 0.02,
0.027, 0.03. The blue curves correspond to the  values (departing from
criticality) 0.036, 0.04, 0.08.
benefit, but also depends on emotions, intentions, and beliefs that
influence the interaction of one individual with others. In this
way, social behavior can have a significant neurophysiological
origin (Frith, 2007; Declerck et al., 2013; Bhanji and Delgado,
2014; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). Experimental social psychology
supports this view: for instance, Kearns and co-workers (Kearns
et al., 2006, 2009; Judd et al., 2010; Kearns, 2012) study the
dynamics of a group of individuals, who are assigned the task
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of reaching consensus with the payoff being determined by the
successful achievement of consensus.
This juxtaposition of the social with the psychological suggests
a connection with the subject, currently in a phase of rapidly
increasing scientific interest, of multilayer networks (D’Agostino
and Scala, 2014). This connection need not have the focus on
failure suggested by the pioneering paper (Buldyrev et al., 2010).
The studies (Boccaletti et al., 2014; Kivelä et al., 2014) moving
in these challenging directions seem to focus on the topology
of the links connecting different layers. The sociological and the
economic levels of this article, on the contrary, are two distinct
networks with the simple lattice topology of a two-dimensional
regular network, interacting at criticality. Since criticality gen-
erates an effective network of strongly correlated elements with
the structure of a scale-free network (Turalska et al., 2012), these
layers can be visualized as inter-linked scale-free systems, with a
criticality-generated complex topology. Although the presented
approach rests on a prescription valid for any topology, running it
on a scale-free network would have inhibited our ability to appre-
ciate the long-range correlations generated by criticality (Turalska
et al., 2012). Using this insight, we propose a new form of game
theory defined on a regular two-dimensional network.
Figure 5 illustrates how the new game theory is formulated. The
level S is the sociological–psychological level and for simplicity,
we assume that the elements of this network are driven by the
decision making model (DMM). We propose two distinct forms
of game theory: (i) the value of altruism; (ii) the benefit of rapid
consensus. In the (i) form of game theory, the sociological debate,
occurring in theS level, concernswhether it is convenient to adopt
the state A or the state S . In the F level, the single individual acts
on the basis of their personal inclination and also as a consequence
of their imitation of the behavior of their neighbors. In the (ii)
form of game theory, the sociological debate also occurs in the
S level. However, in this case, the benefit for society is the expedi-
tious attainment of consensus. The same individuals, operating in
the level F are governed by a conventional form of game theory
where they are driven by the goal of maximal financial benefit.
FIGURE 5 | Interaction between two complex dynamic networks. The
network S is a two-dimensional regular lattice devoted to either a moral
debate (the value of altruism) or to making decision on some issue of social
interest (the benefit of rapid consensus). The network F is the corresponding
network where the single individuals act on the basis of either their personal
financial benefit (the benefit of rapid consensus), or as a result of their
interaction with the nearest neighbors (the value of altruism).
This explains why we adopt the symbol F to denote this level.
However, to be consistent with the spirit of the (i) game theory,
we refer to the level F as the behavioral level.
4. Evolutionary Game Theory: The Value of
Altruism
The model of Section 2 can generate the spreading of selfish
individuals over the whole network if the parameters  and K are
sufficiently small. However, the excessive proliferation of selfish
individuals can be kept under control by the sociological level S .
This approach to the containment of selfishness is done according
to the spirit of the work (Piccinini et al., in preparation), which
is devoted to the societal control of the spreading of a sexually
contracted infection. Piccinini et al. (in preparation) study the
influence of a societal debate on whether to adopt safe sex prac-
tices or not, and the proposed evolutionary game theory presented
herein becomes virtually equivalent to the complex dynamics
studied by them (Piccinini et al., in preparation). This equivalence
requires that the altruist selecting the state A is identified with the
safe sex user, and the individual opposing the adoption of safe sex
precautions is identified with the individual selecting selfishness,
state S. In the situation they (Piccinini et al., in preparation) study,
the sociological debate may favor the stateA because the choice of
the state S is connected to the spreading of an infectious disease.
The sociological debate in the case of the value of altruism game
refers to the choice between the stateA and the state S of Section 2.
We make the assumption that the individuals of the sociological
level S debate the social value of altruism and the dangers of
selfishness.
The connection between criticality and game theory is realized
on the basis of the societal value assigned to the states A and B. In
this version of game theory, the level S is driven by the DMM at
its critical point, while theF level is driven by the two-state model
described in Section 2, with = 0.003 andK = 0.015, namely, also
at its critical point. The system F , in the absence of coupling with
the system S, has a mean field y = A   A, which is characterized
by temporal complexity (Turalska et al., 2011).
Notice that the level S drives the level F by means of very
weak coupling. If a given element at the level S is in the state A
favoring the altruistic choice, then the parameters  and K are
incrementally increased in such a way as to increase the lifetime
of the altruism state in level F . As a consequence, the correlation
function, with y = A  A and x = B  B
C (t) = hx (t) y (t)i
hx2i1=2 hy2i1=2
(4)
is expected to fit the predictions of complexity management
(Aquino et al., 2010). This situation leads to the correlation attain-
ing its maximum, which is an important case discussed in detail
elsewhere. Here, we limit ourselves to pointing out two significant
aspects of this formof evolutionary game theory: (1) the emergence
of long-range correlation and (2) criticality-induced transmission of
information.
4.1. Long-Range Effects
Such effects are present in both the sociological and behavioral
levels. As explained in Section 2, if some individuals on the levelF
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are forced to adopt a given dependence on time, this behavior is
transmitted to all the other individuals of the network. On the one
hand, this property had been previously discussed (Vanni et al.,
2011; Luković et al., 2014). On the other hand, if the sociological
level operates at criticality, we meet the long-range correlation of
the even earlier work (Turalska et al., 2012).
4.2. Information Transmission
To properly appreciate the contribution of this two-layer network
to the laying of a solid scientific foundation for thewidely accepted
conviction that criticality favors information transmission (Tural-
ska et al., 2009; Mora and Bialek, 2011; Attanasi et al., 2014;
Hidalgo et al., 2014), we stress the special role played by temporal
complexity (Turalska et al., 2011).Mora andBialek (2011) recently
remarked that the onset of a phase transition implies critical
slowing down, and consequently an extremely slow regression
of a network perturbation to equilibrium. This slowing down
seemed to them to be incompatiblewith, for instance, the expected
rapid response of a flock of birds to a predator. The theoretical
perspective adopted herein establishes a clear distinction between
critical slowing down and temporal complexity: in spite of both
being generated by criticality, these are two distinct properties of
dynamics (Bologna et al., 2013).
Temporal complexity is a property of phase transition pro-
cesses which occurs when the network has a finite number of
interacting individuals, andwhich vanishes in the thermodynamic
limit, i.e., when the network size becomes infinite. Turalska et al.
(2009) show that there is a close connection between temporal
complexity and ergodicity breakdown. Criticality-induced fluctu-
ations are renewal non-Poisson properties (Bianco et al., 2008)
characterized by the phenomenon of renewal aging, and so by
a condition physically equivalent to an extended sojourn in an
out-of-equilibrium state. In the last few years, some fundamental
work has been done to establish the response of these complex
networks to external perturbation (Barbi et al., 2005; Allegrini
et al., 2007), resulting in a linear response theory that led to a
remarkably accurate agreement with experiment (Allegrini et al.,
2009; Silvestri et al., 2009). The experimental preparation of non-
ergodic complex networks generates a non-stationary cascade of
events, thereby making these systems insensitive to perturbations
that do not share their complexity. This observation led to the
important principle of complexity management (Aquino et al.,
2010), namely, a steady correlation of complex fluctuations with
stimuli of equal or higher complexity, revealed by the method
of ensemble averages. The phenomenon of complexity matching
(Turalska et al., 2009) has the same origin as complexity man-
agement, but it is revealed by single realizations and is proved
(Luković et al., 2014) to generate synchronization between two
criticality-induced fluctuations in the course of their regression
to equilibrium after proper preparation. In conclusion, criticality-
induced synchronization between two complex networks is a
consequence of temporal complexity and of the related aging pro-
cess. Complexity matching (Zare and Grigolini, 2013) is realized
(Luković et al., 2014) as a form of response of a complex network
at criticality to the stimulus exerted on it by another complex
network at criticality, both being far from the thermodynamical
limit.
It is very important to stress that criticality-induced temporal
complexity is associated with ergodicity breakdown, this being
a subject of great interest in the field of molecular diffusion in
biological cells (Metzler et al., 2014). The discovery of ergodicity
breakdown is one of the most important scientific results gener-
ated by 100 years of single particle tracking (Metzler et al., 2014)
and is forcing researchers in this field to go beyond the limits of
conventional statistical physical thought. The study of sociological
and neurophysiological networks is based on the observation
of single systems, an ensemble average over copies of the same
brain, for example, being senseless. For a statistical analysis of
these systems, one is compelled to adopt the procedures that are
emerging from the field of molecular diffusion in biological cells.
The adoption of the time averages made necessary by the fact that
only one sociological trajectory is available led to the discovery
(Piccinini et al., in preparation) of ergodicity breakdown in sociol-
ogy as well as neurophysiology (Turalska et al., 2009). Establishing
whether sharing ergodicity breakdown implies that sociological,
neurophysiological, and biological systems are all in an out-of-
equilibrium state is an open and stimulating problem. While
expressing our wish that this article may attract the attention of
researchers on this fundamental issue, we stress that complexity
management and complexity matching processes go far beyond
the pioneering work of Trefán et al. (1994) and the more recent
work of Godec and Metzler (2013). In fact, this earlier work
deals with the response to perturbation of Lévy walk diffusion
processes, a case in which ergodicity breakdown and aging are
temporary and not perennial as in the case of systems responding
to perturbation according to the predictions of complexity man-
agement (Aquino et al., 2010) and complexity matching (Turalska
et al., 2009; Luković et al., 2014).
5. Evolutionary Game Theory: The Benefit
of Rapid Consensus
This section is devoted to illustrating the benefit of rapid
consensus game. According to Standard and Poor’s, the October
2013 shutdown of the Federal Government of the United States
of America took 24 billion dollars out of the U.S. economy, and
reduced the projected fourth-quarter GDP growth from 3 percent
to 2.4 percent. In the face of such economic swings, it is plausible
to conjecture that the rapid attainment of consensus is beneficial
for the society as a whole, and that eventually consensus can
be measured in terms of monetary gain. Therefore, reaching
consensus on level S is a condition that is incorporated into
the proposed game theory model. The results of psychological
experiments (Kearns, 2012) show that consensus is reached
through the local interactions of individuals. This important
property is inexplicable at first sight. In fact, it seems to be
impossible that a social network reaches consensus without
the condition that all the individuals interact with all the other
individuals, the All-To-All (ATA) condition.
The network S exerts a constraint on the network F based
on the assumption that reaching consensus is very important
for society to function. The DMM is a theoretical sociological
model based on the local imitative interaction of individuals that
nevertheless, when the inter-individual coupling is strong enough,
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generates global properties (West, 2011). This cooperative global
behavior occurs because a sufficiently strong local interaction can
generate a phase transition. At the onset of a phase transition, that
is to say, at criticality, the correlation length between individuals
becomes as large as the size of the social network (Turalska et al.,
2012). In other words, at criticality, a social network function-
ing on the basis of local interactions, becomes indistinguishable
from an ATA network. As a consequence of this observation, the
dynamics of level S is based on the DMM (West, 2011). Alterna-
tively, it may be based on the swarm model (Vicsek et al., 1995),
established in recent work (Vanni et al., 2011) to be characterized
by criticality. Criticality turns the modeled social network into
an ATA network, in spite of the local character of the interaction
between its elements (Vanni et al., 2011).
In summary, the dynamics of level S is based on local
interactions, in the spirit of game theory, but at the same time,
the new approach fits recent discoveries in the field of behavioral
psychology concerning social influence on the decision-making
process by single individuals (Frith, 2007) and, thanks to
criticality, explains why social cooperation at the local level may
accomplish global tasks (Kearns et al., 2006, 2009; Judd et al.,
2010; Kearns, 2012).
5.1. Dynamics of Level F
The hereby illustrated preliminary results refer to the prisoner’s
dilemma scenario. In this game, a cooperator playingwith another
cooperator receives a reward of 1, thereby yielding a financial gain
of 2 for society as a whole. A defector playing with a cooperator
receives b> 1, while the cooperator receives 0, this being an incen-
tive to defect. A defector playing with another defector receives 0.
The social dilemma in this case is given by the condition
1 < b < 2: (5)
In fact, the condition b< 2 corresponds to affording to the whole
of society a financial benefit smaller than that resulting from the
play of two cooperators. In the pioneering work of Nowak and
May (1992), control over the growth of defectors can be exerted
by the topology of the emerging structures, where a cluster of
defectors brings no gain to society, therebymaking it possible for a
cooperator surrounded by cooperators to generate more profit for
the whole of society than a defector at the frontier of a cluster of
defectors. The condition b> 2 does not generate a social dilemma,
because in this case, there is no social control over the spreading
of defectors who, in due time, fill the entire network.
Game theory with behavioral constraints aims at maintaining
a state of social dilemma, thereby preventing an unlimited expan-
sion of either cooperators or defectors through mutual influence,
of levelF on level S and of level S on levelF . The social dilemma
condition is subsequently proven to keep the social network at the
critical point, thus ensuring its adaptability and flexibility, and the
condition of maximal efficiency for information transport.
5.2. The Dynamics of Level S
The dynamics of level S rests on the basic concept of critical-
ity, which is borrowed from physics and extended to complex
networks. Each individual of a set of N individuals makes a
decision between two possible choices, = 1 and = 1, under
the influence of the choices made by the individuals linked to it.
In the absence of interaction, the mean field
x =
PN
i=1 i
N (6)
vanishes, because the probability of selecting = 1 is equal to the
probability of selecting = 1. If the interaction strength is large
enough to achieve the critical value KC, the mean field becomes
either positive or negative. It is important to stress that this is a
phase transition and the critical value KC depends on the network
topology.
The sociological literature of the last few years (Golam, 2004;
Hong and Strogatz, 2011; Masuda, 2013; Sîrbu et al., 2013) has
devoted some attention to the action of contrarians. A contrarian
is an individual, interacting with the individuals linked to it, who
is inclined to make a decision opposite to the opinion of the
majority of its neighbors. The quantitative effects of contrarians
on the global decision depends on the kind of statistical prescrip-
tion adopted to study the social process, this being a subject of
scientific debate. Using the DMM prescription, the results are
remarkably simple and are used to outline the nature of the game
theory based on the criterion of rapid achievement of consensus.
For simplicity, we assume that the defectors on level F act as
contrarians on the level S . The adoption of the ATA condition
makes it possible for a simple analytical prediction to be made
about the influence of the action of contrarians. The transition rate
from state 1 to state 2 in the ATA condition is given by
g12 =
g
2exp ( K) ; (7)
where = p1  p2 with p1 and p2 denoting the fraction of ele-
ments in the states 1 and 2, respectively. The meaning of Eq. (7)
is transparent. If there are more elements in state 1 than in state
2, the transition rate of a given element from 1 to 2 is decreased.
Under the opposite conditions, the transition rate is increased,
thereby making it possible for the network to achieve consensus.
Of course, for the transition from state 2 to state 1 the reverse
condition
g21 =
g
2exp (K) (8)
applies.
We would like to remark that the exponential structure of the
transition rate is chosen so as to make the critical behavior of this
model fall into the Ising basin-of-attraction (Fraiman et al., 2009),
which is well known to physicists. However, this restriction can be
bypassed as shown by the model for the emergence of altruism of
Section 2.
In the presence of contrarians, the elements are separated
into contrarians and cooperators, and the transition rates for the
cooperators are denoted by
g(C)12 =
g
2exp ( K) (9)
and
g(C)21 =
g
2exp (K) ; (10)
i.e., the prescriptions corresponding to Eqs (7) and (8),
respectively. The cooperators make decisions according to
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the majority of the individuals. The contrarians (defectors), on
the contrary, adopt
g(D)12 =
g
2exp (K) (11)
and
g(D)21 =
g
2exp ( K) : (12)
Themaster equation leading the cooperator mean field, described
by C = p(C)1   p(C)2 , reads
d
dtC =
g(C)21   g(C)12
2  
g(C)21 + g
(C)
12
2 C (13)
and the master equation leading the dynamics of defector mean
field, described by D = p(D)1   p(D)2 , reads
d
dtD =
g(D)21   g(D)12
2  
g(D)21 + g
(D)
12
2 D: (14)
The two master equations yield the equilibrium conditions

eq
C =
g(C)21   g(C)12
g(C)21 + g
(C)
12
(15)
and

eq
D =
g(D)21   g(D)12
g(D)21 + g
(D)
12
: (16)
Noting that g(D)12 of Eq. (11) is identical to g
(C)
21 of Eq. (10) and that
g(D)21 of Eq. (12) is identical to g
(C)
12 of Eq. (9), we obtain

eq
D =  eqC : (17)
As pointed out earlier, we make the simplifying assumption
that the contrarians and the congregators of level S coincide with
the defectors and the cooperators of level F , respectively. Thus,
the symbol pD denotes the fraction of contrarians and, when
consensus is possible and K is sufficiently large, the global field
reads
eq =
 
1  pD


eq
C + pD
eq
D ; (18)
where eqC is the global field created by the cooperators and 
eq
D
is the global field created by the defectors. Thanks to Eq. (17), we
turn Eq. (18) into
eq =
 
1  2pD


eq
C : (19)
Eq. (15) can be written in the form

eq
C = tanh
 
Keq

; (20)
which, using Eq. (19), becomes

eq
C = tanh
 
K
 
1  2pD


eq
C

: (21)
The transcendental equation generating the equilibrium mean
field of defectors is the same as the transcendental equation
generating the equilibrium mean field of cooperators. This
apparently counter-intuitive property is the final result of 5 or
6 years of research by our group along the lines of the project
(West, 2011). Also, although this result was derived independently
of the recent psychological experiment (Kurt et al., 2014), both
lead to the same conclusion. Kurt et al. (2014) found that the
distribution of the time durations of the emotional states of two
struggling people is characterized by the same deviation from
an ordinary exponential distribution, regardless of whether the
conflict is tractable or intractable, thereby implying in both cases
the important role of memory (Bar-Tal, 2007; Kurt et al., 2014).
This suggests that the neural dynamics activated by the struggle
between two players obeys the same prescription, their emotional
states being driven by complex systems, their brains, which share
the same complexity.
Note that, in the ATA case, the prediction of Eq. (21) turns out
to be in remarkably good agreement with the numerical results,
as shown by Figure 6. Unfortunately, at the moment of writing
this article, we do not have at our disposal an accurate analytical
prediction for the case of a two-dimensional regular network, on
which to play the new form of game theory. Figure 7 shows,
however, that for a low concentration of defectors, the onset of
criticality shifts to higher values of the control parameter that in
this case, in the absence of defectors, occurs at aboutK =KC= 1.6.
We therefore make the assumption that, in general, it is possible
to adopt the following prescription
K = KC1  pD
; (22)
where KC denotes the critical value of the interaction strength K
in the absence of defectors and  depends on the sensitivity of
the system to the concentration of defectors. The vertical dashed
FIGURE 6 | This figure shows the remarkably good agreement
between numerical calculation and the theoretical prediction on Eq.
(21) in the ATA case. The meaning of the symbols is as follows: red
triangles= no defectors, N= 103; green circles=15% defectors, N= 104,
purple squares= 20% defectors, N= 104; blue stars= 30% defectors,
N= 104, the dashed lines with the same color are the corresponding
theoretical predictions.
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straight lines of Figure 7 aim to illustrate the shift of K at increas-
ing percentages of defectors. They have been plotted using Eq.
(22) with KC= 1.7 and = 2 for the purpose of showing how the
critical value of K increases with increasing pD. They are merely
heuristic and may be trusted only for very small percentages
of defectors. In other words, in the two-dimensional case, the
random distribution of a high percentage of defectors generates
a complex behavior that would require an appropriate theory, still
missing, and for high concentrations of defectors make the order
parameter itself fluctuate, as shown in Figure 7. This interesting
phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article, and for the
numerical illustration of this form of game theory, we adopt for
simplicity Eq. (22) with KC= 1 and = 2, which is valid only in
the ATA case, but which serves well the purpose of affording a
qualitatively correct illustration of this form of game theory.
The interaction intensity necessary to reach consensus becomes
infinitely largewhen half of the units are defectors, and no consen-
sus is reached with cooperation efforts of moderate intensity. For
pD 
1

=
1
2 : (23)
consensus is not possible, regardless of the intensity of the coop-
eration effort.
The prescription of Eq. (22), emerging from our research work,
although simple, reflects a complex and interesting sociological
condition. The interaction strength KC depends on the topology
of the network and predicts the emergence of criticality when
there are no defectors. The presence of defectors is not necessarily
negative. In fact, assigning to the social network an interaction
strength larger thanK given by Eq. (22) has the effect of generating
FIGURE 7 | This figure shows the emergence of the non-vanishing
mean field upon increase of the control parameter K in the presence
of different concentrations of defectors in the case of the regular
two-dimensional lattice. The meaning of the symbols is as follows: red
triangles= no defectors, green circles= 4% defectors; purple-white
triangles= 10% defectors; blue stars= 16% defectors. The vertical dashed
lines denote the value of K corresponding to the earlier four increasing
percentages of defectors (with colors matching that of the associated
symbol). These straight lines have been obtained using Eq. (22) with KC= 1.7
and = 2.
a supercritical state, making the system insensitive to its envi-
ronment and incapable of exchanging information with another
identical social network (Vanni et al., 2011). To make possible
for a complex network to drive another complex network, both
networks should be at criticality. Our research has recently shown
(Zare and Grigolini, 2013) that a few individuals of a network A
driven by a few individuals of a network B, with both networks
at criticality, establish a surprisingly accurate synchronization
between A and B. This theoretical result affords an explanation
of a recent experiment done at Duke University (Pais-Vieira et al.,
2013) on the transmission of information from a rat brain B to
a rat brain A. A few electrodes implanted in the brain of rat B
transmit a signal to a few electrodes implanted in the brain of rat
A and induce a surprising correlation between the motion of the
whiskers of rat A and the motion of the whiskers of rat B. This
surprising synchronization is explained if the two brains operate
at criticality.
Eq. (22) suggests that a sufficiently large concentration of
defectors,
p(crit)D =
1


1  KCK

; (24)
with K >KC, turns the supercritical into a critical condition,
thereby rendering the social network sensitive to external stimuli
and to the information generated by an identical social network.
The beneficial role of defectors is illustrated by Figure 8. A large
cooperation strengthmakes the network depart significantly from
the critical condition, where the network is flexible and can adapt
itself to new external conditions. The global field generated by
cooperators yields a typical second-order phase transition. For
FIGURE 8 | This figure shows the equilibrium mean field generated by
cooperators as a function of the cooperation strength K in the
presence of an increasing percentage of defectors. The meaning of the
symbols is as follows: red circles= no defectors; blue triangles= 15%
defectors; purple triangles= 20% defectors; green triangles= 30% defectors;
orange triangles= 50% defectors; cyan triangles= 60% defectors. N= 103.
The time length of the program is 107 time steps and the results have
obtained by making averages on 10 realizations. The purpose of the red
vertical line is an eye-guide showing which is the right percentage to reach to
make the system critical.
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values of the cooperation strengthK smaller than the critical value
established by the rule of Eq. (22), no consensus is possible and
the cooperator’s global field vanishes at equilibrium. Figure 8
shows that increasing the percentage of defectors requires a higher
and higher value of the cooperation strength K in order for the
social network to reach consensus. In the absence of defectors, at
a moderately large value of cooperation strength (K = 1.5 in the
example of Figure 8, where KC= 1), the network is in a supercrit-
ical condition, inconvenient for the reception and transmission
of information (Vanni et al., 2011). As an effect of the beneficial
role of defectors, the system is shown to reach criticality when
the defector percentage is about 15%, in accordance with the
crucial percentage of Eq. (24), which is exact in the limiting case
of infinitely many individuals. Figure 8 shows that the red line
crosses the critical region between pD= 0.15 and pD= 0.20. A
further increase of the defector percentage has the effect of shift-
ing criticality to higher values of cooperation strength, thereby
making the network, as indicated by the red line, fall into the sub-
critical condition where no consensus is possible and the system
becomes inefficient for information transport (Vanni et al., 2011).
The correspondence between the DMM’s properties and
the neurophysiology of people debating contentious issues
is not accidental. Inhibitory links play the same crucial role
as contrarians in social systems. In the absence of inhibitory
links, the neural network may be in a supercritical state. The
exchange of information between two neural networks in this
supercritical condition is very weak. Increasing the percentage
of inhibitory links has the effect of recovering criticality and with
it the maximal efficiency of information transport from one to
another identical network. This interesting phenomenon is clearly
illustrated by Figure 9, derived from the work of Usefie Mafahim
et al. (2015). The transport of information between two neural
networks with no inhibitory links and with the cooperation
strength denoted by the red line of Figure 9 is very low. The
action of 10% of inhibitory links has the effect of recovering the
condition of maximal efficiency of information transport. This
surprising similarity between social and neural networks sheds
light into the social effects of behavioral psychology.
5.3. Interaction Between Level F and Level S
We have seen that the presence of defectors (contrarians) in the
ATA condition has the effect of boosting the value of K necessary
to reach criticality, according to the simple formula of Eq. (22),
withKC= 1 and= 2. To use these results in the new game theory
that we propose in this paper, it is necessary to adopt a two-
dimensional regular lattice, where each player has four nearest
neighbors, some of which may be defectors. In this case, we do
not have yet at our disposal a simple formula as that of Eq. (22).
We conjecture that a formula of the same kind, with KC 6= 1 and
 6= 2 may be very close to the true solution. However, to illus-
trate with preliminary numerical calculations how the new game
theory works, we use Eq. (22) with KC= 1 and = 2. The results
produced by a more appropriate expression for K as a function of
pD are expected to agree qualitatively with the numerical results of
this subsection.
We adopt as control parameter pD rather than K. We assign to
K a value that, in the absence of defectors, would correspond to
FIGURE 9 | Exchange of information between two neural networks.
This is the result of a numerical experiment measuring the transport of
information from a network B (perturbing network) to a network A (perturbed
network). Three percent of neurons of network A are forced to adopt the
behavior of 3% of neurons of network B. The model adopted is the integrate
and fire model of Usefie Mafahim et al. (2015) with random choice of initial
condition replacing the stochastic force of Usefie Mafahim et al. (2015). The
efficiency of the transport of information from B to A is evaluated by means of
the correlation parameter C, discussed in Usefie Mafahim et al. (2015). The
vertical red line is an eye-guide indicating the value of the cooperation strength
necessary to reach criticality in the presence of 10% of inhibitory links.
the supercritical condition. Using Eq. (24) with KC= 1 and = 2,
we obtain for pD the critical value
p(crit)D =
1
2

1  1K

: (25)
We select K = 2.1 and consequently, on the basis of Eq. (25),
we obtain p(crit)D = 0:262. The game theory illustrated in this
subsection will make the system evolve in such a way as to remain
close to the critical condition p(crit)D = 0:262.
Let us imagine that the initial condition corresponds to
pD > p
(crit)
D . In this case, there is no consensus rather there is
a delay in making a decision, which is detrimental for society.
The society must exert a control on the excessive growth in the
number of defectors thereby preventing pD from going much
beyond pD = p
(crit)
D . This control is exerted by assigning to the
payoff b the value bC= 1.75, which is known (Nowak and May,
1992) to favor the increase of the concentration of cooperators.
This is the control exerted on the growth of defectors on the basis
of the observation that the lack of consensus corresponds to a
societal financial disadvantage.
Now let us imagine that as a result of this control the concentra-
tion of defectors becomes very small, namely, pD < p
(crit)
D . In this
condition, the sociological network becomes supercritical. This
corresponds to the condition of a neural network when the num-
ber of inhibitory links becomes too small. In this case, as shown by
Figure 9, the network is no longer flexible and is insensitive to the
influence exerted on it by a neural network at criticality, due to the
action of a sufficiently large number of defectors. In this condition,
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a sociological system obeying the DMM prescription would not
be able to adapt itself to an unexpected emergency condition, as
illustrated by the work of Vanni et al. (2011) with the example
of a swarm of birds. The transmission of information from the
environment to the system either becomes weak or is completely
quenched (Vanni et al., 2011). To counterbalance this negative
condition, the payoff b attains the value bD= 2.05 that according
to Nowak andMay (1992) would make the defectors fill the entire
network. This has the effect of preventing significant penetration
of the network into supercritical territory.
Figure 10 illustrates the numerical results generated by these
prescriptions and shows that the desideratum of establishing con-
sensus keeps the growth of defectors under control. As a conse-
quence of this constraint, the fraction of defectors never reaches
themaximal value pD= 1, corresponding to the complete defeat of
cooperators. The concentration of defectors quicklymoves toward
a maximal value close to 0.5 followed by regression to the critical
value p(crit)D . The whole region pD > p
(crit)
D corresponds to a
vanishing degree of consensus. However, due to the finiteness of
the number of elements, the fluctuations of the mean field in the
critical region are very large and, as proved elsewhere (Holling-
shad et al., 2013), criticality is not a singular condition limited
to the dashed line of Figure 4, rather it applies to a relatively
large stripe around the dashed line. Thus, the network spends a
significant amount of time at criticality without penetrating the
supercritical territory that would suppress its flexibility. We hope
that these preliminary results may trigger the additional research
work necessary to give a more solid foundation to this form of
game theory. We note that the behavior illustrated by Figure 10
seems to be periodic and we conjecture that reducing the distance
of bD from bC may have the effect of creating an intermittent
process with the temporal complexity (Turalska et al., 2011) that
was found to be a signature of criticality.
6. Cooperation-Induced Synchronization,
Emergence of Cognition and Concluding
Remarks
Recent work on the DMM sociological model (Turalska et al.,
2012) suggests that cognition emerges as a result of criticality-
induced long-range correlation. Herein, we use the neural and
social theoretical perspective (Turalska et al., 2012) to develop a
new form of game theory that mirrors the increasing conviction
among behavioral psychologists that economic choices are not
entirely “rational” (Shefrin, 2003; Shefrin and Statman, 2003).
On the basis of the arguments illustrated by Rosenfeld (2013),
that cooperation-induced locality breakdown is a form of Turing
intelligence, we use theDMM theory (Turalska et al., 2012) to sub-
stantiate, through the statistical physics of phase transitions, the
early hypothesis of McDougall (1928) concerning the existence of
a collective mind, here rephrased as collective cognition.
6.1. Benefits and Limits of the Proposed Forms
of Game Theory
The separate individuals of the game theory proposed in Section 3
are individuals locally interacting according to the criterion of
maximal financial benefit. The arguments that we use to constrain
FIGURE 10 | The Nowak and May prisoner’s dilemma game, run on a
2D network with N=1002 players, and modified to have two b values,
bC=1.75 and bD= 2.05. The interaction strength was set to K= 2.1. (A) A
snapshot of the strategies when there is a majority of defectors (blue). (B) A
snapshot of the strategies when there is a majority of cooperators (yellow). (C)
The time evolution of the fraction of defectors (blue line). The critical fraction of
defectors is p(crit)D = 0:262 (dashed line). The snapshots in (A,B) were taken at
times t= 29 (red dot) and t=54 (green dot), respectively. The two horizontal
yellow lines denote the stripe within which the social system remains at
criticality, as a result of the finite-size effect (Hollingshad et al., 2013).
the growth of defectors match those adopted in the pioneering
work ofNowak andMay (1992, 1993).We supplement their theory
by means of criticality-induced locality breakdown, which can
be interpreted as global awareness of the benefits of cooperation.
The excessive expansion of cooperators is counterbalanced by the
super-criticality-induced loss of long-range perception, favoring
the growth of defectors andwith it the recovery of criticality and of
a renewed perception of social benefit. The control of the excessive
expansion of cooperators is an ad hoc property of this form of
evolutionary game theory.
The form of game theory of Section 4 is not affected by the
limits of this ad hoc condition. This is so because the cooperation
strength K is fixed so as to maintain the level S at criticality, and
consequently in a condition of long-range perception.However, in
this version of the game, the self-organization toward a criticality,
moving from either a super- or a sub-critical condition, is lacking
and itmay be realized through a form of control such as feed-back.
6.2. Group Mind, Jung, Kahneman, and Tversky
The game theory proposed in Section 4 is expected to yield results
even more ambitious than shedding light into the emergence
of altruism, namely, to provide insight into the emergence of
cognition.
According toRosenfeld (2013), swarm intelligence (Vanni et al.,
2011) is a form of Turing intelligence. This may lead to a recon-
sideration of the concept of group mind proposed in 1920 by
McDougall (1928). In the first 20 pages of Chapter I of McDougall
(1928), McDougall, replying to Maciver, another psychologist,
writes: “the environmentwhich influences the individual in his life
as a member of an organized group is neither the sum of his fellow
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members as individuals, nor is it something that has other than a
mental existence. It is the organized group as such, which exists
only or chiefly in the persons of those composing it, but which
does not exist in the mind of any one of them, and which operates
upon each so powerfully just because it is something indefinitely
greater, more powerful, more comprehensive than the mere sum
of those individuals.”
American psychologists criticized McDougall because, in their
opinion, mind is a property of a single (human) individual.
Although the concept of group mind has been discarded by
psychologists and cognitive scientists, there are good reasons to
believe, as Van Bavel et al. (2014) point out, that the Aristotelian
conviction of the highly social nature of human beings may well
re-emerge shaping our beliefs about the origin of cognition.
We use the term cognition rather than mind, which to some
may have religious implications, to maintain our research work at
a rigorously scientific level. We can rephrase the criticism of the
work ofMcDougall as the allegedly inappropriate assumption that
a group of individuals may have cognition as a group rather than
as single individuals.
This rephrasing of the criticism of McDougall’s work, however,
opens the door to the problem of explaining the emergence of
cognition in the brain of a single individual, which is unsolved
and still closely related to religious beliefs about how the soul
(mind) is connected to the brain. We note that the adoption of
our interpretation of the work of McDougall, i.e., the assumption
that cognition emerges at the social level, makes it possible to
explain the origin of the collective unconscious of Jung (1991).
The social group S, endowed with Turing intelligence (Rosenfeld,
2013), drives the level F , the brain of a single individual, through
the complexity management principle and this process can be
interpreted as a social group transmitting its cognition to F ,
thought of as the brain of a single individual.
It is interesting to notice that the transmission of cognition can
be realized through the steady action of only a few individuals
(Vanni et al., 2011; Luković et al., 2014), the parents of baby, on
the brain of the baby, under the key assumption that the brain of
the baby is a network at criticality, thereby in the proper condition
to host cognition. This conjecture seems to be in line with recent
advances in the field of neurophysiology (Pierce et al., 2014).
This is an ambitious but realistic hypothesis that may account
for the transmission of the collective unconscious (Jung, 1991)
from one generation to the next. We make the conjecture that the
group mind has a conscious (group mind) and an unconscious
(Jung) component, both of which are transmitted to single indi-
viduals through the complexity matching process advocated by
our group as the optimal condition for the transfer of information
from one network at criticality to another network at criticality
(Zare and Grigolini, 2013).
On the one hand, according to Zafiovski (2014), the tradi-
tional view of economics, resting on the assumption that homo
economicus makes fully rational choices based on the attain-
ment of maximal individual benefit, is failing and researchers
in economics are moving toward post-rational choice models
involving (also) irrational or non-rational elements. On the other
hand, the research work of Kahneman and Tversky on deci-
sion making under uncertainty (Shefrin and Statman, 2003) has
triggered many psychophysics experiments that have contributed
to establishing the connection between decision making and
neural networks. This brings us back to the central idea of
this article, that being the crucial role of criticality, and to
the hypothesis that the brain is a network at criticality. For
instance, the recent psychological experiment designed by Cor-
rell (2008) to disclose unconscious forms of racial prejudice
has a neurophysiological foundation and the work (Grigolini
et al., 2009) shows that the criticality hypothesis may help to
obtain a deeper understanding of the results of this experi-
ment. The growing networks of links between disciplines seem
to obey the same cooperative processes as those hypothesized
to be foundational for the emergence of intelligence (Villa Soto
and Graf, 2013), thereby suggesting that the internet revolu-
tion may correspond to a new phase in the evolution of group
mind (cognition).
6.3. Cognition and Social Cognition
In accordance with the title, our approach is expected to afford
important contributions to improving the current knowledge
about cognition. We would like to attract the attention of the
readers to a few recent publications supporting our view. Werner
(2011) recently discussed thewidely accepted conviction about the
close connection between computational science and intelligence
and argued that it is nothing more than a metaphor. He explicitly
wrote that his essay is equivalent to apply the Latin statement
sic transit gloria mundi to Cybernetics. Werner wrote that recent
experimental results in neurophysiology corroborate the idea of
criticality and “violate the intents of the ‘framers’ of the Compu-
tational Metaphor for whom computation was discrete (and gen-
erally synchronous) in the programmable case, and continuous in
Neural Networks.” Another aspect of the neural dynamics of the
brain that the Computer Metaphor cannot successfully address is
its unpredictability and its non-ergodic nature. In a more recent
paper, published in a special issue of Chaos, Solitons and Frac-
tals, devoted to Emergent Critical Brain Dynamics, Werner (2013)
reiterated the statement that the brain does not compute and
he quotes the paper (Grigolini et al., 2009) (earlier mentioned
by us to explain the experimental observations of Correll) and
other articles of our group as a paradigmatic example of cognition
emergence. Temporal complexity is associated to the occurrence
of renewal non-Poisson processes that are responsible for aging
and ergodicity breaking. This is confirmed by the technique
adopted by Fingelkurts et al. (2013) to detect rapid transitional
periods. These authors found the brain to be in the exact condition
necessary to produce the 1/f noise Grigolini et al. (2009). Another
remarkable experimental observation supporting Werner’s theo-
retical perspective about cognition is that of Allegrini et al. (2013).
These authors found that the transition from the unconsciousness
of sleeping people to the awake state is to some extent equivalent
to the transition from the sub-critical to the critical condition and
to the related temporal complexity. Many authors, for instance
Kitzbichler et al. (2009), emphasize the important role of criticality
for information transport from one to another area of the brain,
although the role of non-ergodicity in the information transport is
not yet understood.We hope that this paper may contribute to the
generation of a debate on this important aspect, andwe plan in fact
to expand in future work the non-ergodic theoretical arguments
of Section 4.
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Finally, to establish a connection with our arguments about
Jung and the subconscious, we would like to mention the
research currently made along the lines of the original work
of Blanco (1988). This work, dealing with human cognition,
addresses the important purpose of connecting cognition with
emotion, a challenging issue that according to Werner cannot be
settled by using the computer metaphor. In fact, some authors,
for instance Lauro-Gotto (2008) are connecting the origin of
emotions to the subconscious level that is described as a kind of
network characterized by ultra-metric topology reminiscent of
the topology of spin-glasses (Mezard et al., 1987). How does the
subconscious network communicate with the conscious network?
We make the conjecture that this may be done, thanks to the
complexity matching and complexity management that play a
fundamental role in the theory that we are proposing in this
article. We want to stress that in our theoretical approach the
nature of the cooperating units is not important, and this is the
reason why, as emphasized by the title, we extend the emergence
of cognition from the human mind to social networks, thereby
going back to the view of McDougall but supporting his view
with the crucial role of criticality. In the next section, we shall
discuss further recent contributions to social cognition and their
connection with the theory proposed in this article.
6.4. Looking Ahead
We live in times of rapid progress in physiology as well as network
science. The Frontiers special issue Toward a Neuroscience of
Social Interaction (Pfeiffer et al., 2014) hosts 52 interesting articles,
some ofwhich either afford solid support to the apparently conjec-
tural assumptions made in Section 2 or illustrate open problems
that may be settled by research work done in the direction laid out
in the present article. The neurophysiological roots of imitation by
social interaction which are essential for the growth of altruism
referred to in Section 2 and the game theory of Section 4 are
discussed in detail by Froese et al. (2012) and Dumas et al. (2012).
An overview of themost commonly employed economic games in
social neuroscience (Engemann et al., 2012) supports our proposal
regarding the interaction between the sociological level S and
the behavioral level F . The research work (Coey et al., 2012)
mentions the open problem of going beyond the limits of periodic
behavior to study the correlation between different agents in a
social context, an issue that may benefit from the complexity
matching perspective we have advocated (Turalska et al., 2009;
Zare and Grigolini, 2013; Luković et al., 2014) and which has
been successfully adopted by Kello’s group (Abney et al., 2014)
to study dyadic conversation and social interactions in general.
The synchronization between the neural network A and neural
network B of Figure 9 seems to be quite appropriate to account
for the transmission of information from the right frontal area of
the speaker to the medial frontal area of the listener illustrated in
Figure 6 of Kuhlen et al. (2012).
The complexity matching process advocated herein can be
used to afford the proper “non-reductionist” theoretical tool that
the authors DiPaolo and Jaegher (2012) need to account for the
coupling between the brains of two interacting members that can-
not be established by observing their coordinated behavior. This
latter article also reinforces the claim of Section 2 on the recent
progress of neurophysiology supporting the groupmind theory by
McDougall. They (DiPaolo and Jaegher, 2012) attempt a mapping
of: “the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction
and neural processes” with a theoretical hypothesis where “social
understanding happens in the absence of immediate interaction.”
The readers can find a further example of rapid interdisci-
plinary progress involving sociology and neurophysiology in the
recent issue of Nature Neuroscience Focus on social neuroscience).
The interesting articles of this issue give strong support to the
herein proposed models, which rest on the actions of interacting
units inspired by the actions of people. According to Nature
Neuroscience, the “brains” of these units are shaped by nature so as
to favor social behavior, and the statistical properties of themodels
of this article are compatible with this condition. As mentioned in
this section, the model of Section 2 is based on the assumption
that the altruistic choice made by some units is imitated by their
neighbors, an indication of their social nature. Also, the decision
making model (DMM) of Section 3 and Section 4 is based on
the imitation assumption and consequently on the social nature
of the interacting units. McCall and Singer (2012) illustrate the
first steps that have recently been made in neuroendocrinology
to shed light on affiliative behavior in humans, thanks to the rich
information provided by the study of the social behavior of non-
human animals. The review of Zaki andOchsner (2012) shows the
increasing interest researchers have in establishing the neural ori-
gin of empathy, so as to determine brain–behavior links. The arti-
cles of Eisenberger and Cole (2012) and Davidson and McEwen
(2012) confirm the importance of social relationships for physical
health, an important fact to take into account even if the social
environment may be the source of psychiatric disorder (Meyer-
Lindenberg and Tost, 2012). Although some important properties
of social interaction revealed by these studies, for instance the
neural origin of third-party punishment (Buckholtz and Marois,
2012), are not yet considered by the herein illustrated theoreti-
cal approach to a new form of game theory, we are convinced
that such modeling can be properly extended to include them
without weakening the importance of the connection between
evolutionary game theory and criticality.
7. Conclusion
The most important element of novelty in this article is the
connection of the new types of game theory with criticality. The
main purpose of game theory is to establish the origin of altruism
in sociological systems. In the literature on this subject, insuffi-
cient attention has been devoted to the fact that many emergent
properties of organized societies must be the result of a phase
transition from the units being virtually independent to being
correlated over large distances in space and time. The properties
at the phase transition, on the other hand, correspond to an out-
of-equilibrium condition characterized by ergodicity breakdown.
As a consequence, this article establishes a connection between
socio-psychological processes and the ergodicity breakdown of
anomalous diffusion in biological cells (Metzler et al., 2014).
Perc and Grigolini (2013) have challenged researchers in the
field of evolutionary game theory to establish a connection with
the neurophysiology of the brain, and especially with cognition,
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Hebbian learning and criticality-induced long-range correlation
(Turalska et al., 2012). As shown in the latter reference, a deep
similarity exists between neurophysiological and sociological pro-
cesses, and for evolutionary game theory to fit the interdisci-
plinary trend of the evolving science of complexity, significant
efforts are required to shed light on the origin of this similarity.
This is equivalent to generating forms of game theory taking into
account that behavioral psychology yields experimental evidence
(Kearns, 2012) on the social nature of the human brain. The
present article is the first salvo in the intellectual assault on the
challenge raised by Perc and Grigolini (2013).
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